Ivory Tower in Escrow
Masao Miyoshi

boundary 2, Volume 27, Number 1, Spring 2000, pp. 7-50 (Article)

Published by Duke University Press
Ivory Tower in Escrow

Masao Miyoshi

Higher education is undergoing a rapid sea change. Everyone knows and senses it, but few try to comprehend its scope or imagine its future. This

I have presented this essay in various stages at the following institutions and conferences: the conference on Critical Theories: China and West, at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Humanities and the Human Normal University; the Border Studies Research Circle, the University of Wisconsin, Madison; the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Conference, the National Tsing Hua University, Taipei; the conference on Aesthetics and Difference: Cultural Diversity, Literature, and the Arts, at UC Riverside; the Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity and the Department of Ethnic Studies, UC San Diego; the Critical Theory Institute, UC Irvine; the Institute for Global Studies, the University of Minnesota; and the Freeman Lecture Series in Oregon. I am in debt to the organizers and audiences for their responses. Many friends and colleagues have read the manuscript also in various versions, and I am grateful for their comments and critiques: Marti Archibald, Paul Bové, Chen Kuan-Hsing, Eric Cazdyn, Noam Chomsky, Rey Chow, Arif Dirlik, H. D. Harootunian, Gerald Iguchi, Fredric Jameson, Mary Layoun, Meaghan Morris, Richard Okada, Edward Said, Rosaura Sanchez, Ulrike Schaede, Don Wayne, Wang Fengzhen, and Rob Wilson. I would like to thank especially Allen Paau, the director of the Office of Technology Transfer, UC San Diego, who spent a generous amount of time with me on this paper.

two-part essay makes some guesses by observing recent events and recalling the bygone past. Part 1 describes the quickening conversion of learning into intellectual property and of the university into the global corporation in today's research universities in the United States—and, increasingly, everywhere else. Part 2 puzzles over the failure of the humanities at this moment as a supposed agency of criticism and intervention.

1. The Conversion of Learning into Intellectual Property

Richard C. Atkinson, the president of the University of California since 1995, has repeatedly sought to identify the role of the world's largest research university. As he sees it, the goal of today's research university is to build an alliance with industries: "The program works like this. A UC researcher joins with a scientist or engineer from a private company to develop a research proposal. A panel of experts drawn from industry and academia selects the best projects for funding." Thus, although university research encompasses "basic research, applied research, and development," basic research, now called "curiosity research . . . driven by a sheer interest in the phenomena," is justified only because "it may reach the stage where there is potential for application and accordingly a need for applied research." Development—that is, industrial utility—is the principal objective of the research university.

In another short essay titled "Universities and the Knowledge-Based Economy," Atkinson remarks that "universities like Cambridge University and other European universities almost all take the view that university research should be divorced from any contact with the private sector." In contrast to this "culture that eschewed commercial incentives," there has always been in the United States "a tendency to build bridges between universities and industry." This is the background, as he sees it, of places

3. Richard C. Atkinson, "Universities and the Knowledge-Based Economy," paper presented at the California State Senate Fiscal Retreat, 3 February 1996, available at www.ucop.edu/ucophome/pres/comments/senate.html. Actually, Cambridge has been forming an alliance with business by, for instance, developing a science park since the 1960s and forming an internal incubator corporation, Cambridge University Technical Services, Ltd. Though a late starter, Oxford University is also catching up with its Isis Innovation.
such as Silicon Valley and Route 128, and he proceeds to claim that one in four American biotech companies is in the vicinity of a UC campus, and that 40 percent of Californian biotech companies, including three of the world’s largest, Amgen, Chiron, and Genetech, were started by UC scientists.

How does this marketized university protect its academic integrity? Atkinson is confident: “Our experience over the last 15 years or so has taught us a great deal about safeguarding the freedom to publish research findings, avoiding possible conflicts of interest and in general protecting the university’s academic atmosphere and the free rein that faculty and students have to pursue what is of interest to them.”

The issue of academic freedom—as well as the conflict of interest and commitment—is in fact complex and treacherous in today’s entrepreneurial university, as we will see later. However, in this essay, written soon after he took office, Atkinson dismisses academic freedom as an already resolved negotiation between “academic atmosphere” and personal interest, and he has not touched the subject again since.

Like most university administrators today, Atkinson makes no extensive educational policy statement, not to say a full articulation of his educational views and thoughts, most announcements being scattered among truncated speeches or op-ed pieces. The days of Robert M. Hutchins and Derek Bok, never mind Wilhelm von Humboldt and John Henry Newman, are long gone. It is thus perfectly understandable, if somewhat disquieting to a few, that he should give minimally short shrift to research in the humanities and social sciences in the university.

According to Atkinson, the university does have another role as “the shaper of character, a critic of values, a guardian of culture,” but that is in “education and scholarship,” which presumably are wholly distinct activities from serious R & D. He thus pays tributes, in his Pullias Lecture at the University of Southern California, to only one specific example each from the two divisions of human knowledge. As for the social sciences, he men-


5. While chancellor at UC San Diego, Atkinson, with Donald Tuzin, a professor in the Department of Anthropology, authored an article titled “Equilibrium in the Research University,” Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning (May/June 1992): 21–31. It is a general statement regarding the missions of the university, of teaching, of general education, and so forth, but, even here, Atkinson and Tuzin barely touch the intellectual issues faced by the humanities and the social sciences.
tions just one book, *Habits of the Heart*, a mainstream recommendation of American core values, and asserts that the social sciences shape “our public discussion of the values that animate our society.” The Humanities Research Institute, at UC Irvine, similarly, is “an important voice in the dialogue about the humanities and their contributions to our culture and our daily lives.” Aside from this reference to one book and one institution, Atkinson has little else to say about the work in the humanities and in the social sciences. He then goes on to assert that the existence of research programs in the humanities and the social sciences at a university devoted to applied science is itself important.\(^6\) Of course, it is possible that I missed some of his pronouncements, but as far as I could discover, there is no other statement concerning the humanities and the social sciences by Atkinson.\(^7\) His listlessness to any research outside of R & D is unmistakable.

A mere generation ago, in 1963, another president of the UC system, Clark Kerr, published *The Uses of the University*, originally given as one of the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, in which he defined the university as a service station responsive to multiple social forces rather than an autonomous site of learning.\(^8\) These forces, in actuality, consisted mainly of national defense, agribusiness, and other corporate interests. Yet the multiplicity was defined as the mediator of various and diverse expectations, however one-sided its arbitration may have been. It was still proposed to be an interventionary agent. The book was reread the following year when the UC Berkeley campus exploded with the demand for free speech by students, many of whom were fresh from the voter registration drive in the South that summer. The students and faculty who took an antimultiplicity stand insisted that the university not only produced multiple skills and applications but also “enrich[ed] and enlighten[ed] the lives of its students—informing them with the values of the intellect.” Intellectual honesty, politi-

---

6. Richard C. Atkinson, “Visions and Values: The Research University in Transition,” the 19th Annual Pullias Lecture, delivered at USC on 1 March 1997, available at www.ucop.edu/ucophome/pres/comments/pulli.html. Atkinson’s writing is not always clear. My sentence is a paraphrase of the following: “In each case the fact that these activities unfolded in an institution with research as a central mission has been essential to their nature and impact.”

7. Atkinson has another op-ed piece, “It Takes Cash to Keep Ideas Flowing,” *Los Angeles Times*, 25 September 1998, which, as the unself-conscious title suggests, repeats what he has been expressing all along. I am grateful to the UC Office of the President for its generous cooperation with my inquiries.

cal health, and the social vision of a better future were the components of higher education for them.9 Thus the movement for civil rights, racial equality, peace, feminism—together with free speech—found its place inside the university.

Kerr’s multiversity was perhaps the first candid admission of the university as part of the corporate system by anyone in the administration of higher education. It is crucial, however, to realize that his recognition of its multiple functions was yet a far cry from Atkinson’s unself-conscious idea of the university as a site dedicated to corporate R & D. Conversely, the antimultiversity view of the students and faculty of the 1960s matter-of-factly countered Kerr’s reformulation with the long-established tradition of “liberal education.” In the hindsight of the 1990s, this mainstream fable of liberal education as free inquiry also requires reexamination and reformulation. We need to register here, at any rate, that today’s corporatized university—which would have been an unspeakable sacrilege for many less than a generation ago—is now being embraced with hardly any complaint or criticism by the faculty, students, or society at large. What is it that has transpired between the university as the mediator and the university as the corporate partner, between the protest of the sixties and the silence of the nineties? Why this acquiescence? We need to return to the beginning of the modern university so that we may see more clearly the institutional changes alongside the unfolding of modern history.


The modern university was built around 1800 to fill the need for knowledge production as Europe and the United States prepared themselves for expansion overseas. Scientific and technological research was its primary program, as it was launched in the name of enlightenment and progress. Together with practical knowledge, however, what is now called the humanities and the social sciences was advanced by the emerging bourgeoisie. But the educational transformation from the ancient regime to the revolutionary bourgeois democracy was not as radical as one might suspect. On the one hand, an old-style university education was the noblesse oblige of aristocracy, and despite the self-serving devotion to the maintenance of its class position, it claimed to be anti-utilitarian or use-less. Erudition, learning for the sake of learning, refinement, intellectual pleasure—such privileged
and elevated play constituted the goal of aristocratic education. Bourgeois revolutionary education, on the other hand, was rational, universal, secular, and enlightened. It, too, claimed to be neutral and objective rather than partisan or utilitarian. It is under these circumstances that “liberal” education continued to be a crucial idea of the modern university. There was, however, a more central agenda of founding the modern national state, which demanded the construction, information, and dissemination of the national identity by inculcating common language and centralizing history, culture, literature, and geography. The state promoted national knowledge closely aligned with practical knowledge. Despite its pretense, national knowledge was thus profoundly partisan, and liberal education and national education were often in conflict. They could be, at the same time, in agreement, too: After all, the nineteenth-century state was founded by the bourgeoisie, and it was willing to accommodate the surviving aristocracy, although it was adamant in excluding the interest of the emergent working class. Liberal education was tolerated, or even encouraged, since it promoted bourgeois class interests. It appropriated courtly arts, music, poetry, drama, and history, and, over the years, established the canon now designated as high and serious culture. Liberal education and national education contradicted and complemented each other, as the state was engaged in its principal task of expanding the market and colony by containing overseas barbarians, rivaling the neighboring nations, and suppressing the aspiring underclass. The modern university as envisioned by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Humboldt, Newman, Charles Eliot, T. H. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, Daniel Coit Gilman, Thorstein Veblen, Hutchins, and Jacques Barzun contained such contradiction and negotiation of utilitarian nationism and anti-utilitarian inquiry.

Newman had his church, and his university—a separate site—was merely to educate the “gentlemen,” Lord Shaftsbury’s cultured men, who were aloof to the utility of expertise and profession as well as oblivious to lives and aspirations of the lower order. Newman’s heart always belonged to aristocratic Oxford, even while he was writing The Idea of a University for a Catholic university in Dublin. Huxley’s scientific research, on the other hand, was devoted to practice and utility, and, unlike the Oxbridge tradition, it was to provide expertise and profession, not Arnoldian culture and criticism. The myth of the university as a site of liberal education, that is, class-free, unrestricted, self-motivated, and unbiased learning, survives to this

day. And yet academia has always been ambivalent. In the name of class-
less learning, it sought to mold its members in the bourgeois class identity.
Emerson’s “American Scholar” deployed a strategy of defining American
learning as non-American or trans-American. In short, it managed to be
both American and non-American at the same time, while making American
synonymous with universal. This hidden contradiction can readily be com-
pared to Arnold’s idea of “culture,” free and spontaneous consciousness,
which is supposedly free from class bias and vulgar self-interest. To safe-
guard this culture, however, Arnold did not hesitate to invoke the “sacred”
“state,” which will unflinchingly squash any working-class “anarchy and dis-
order,” as he advocated during the second Reform Bill agitation around the
late 1860s.11

In the United States, Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act in 1862,
setting “the tone for the development of American universities, both public
and private.”12 This land-grant movement introduced schools of agriculture,
engineering, home economics, and business administration. And later, the
land-grant colleges and universities were required to teach a military train-
ing program, ROTC. Thus no modern university has been free from class
interests, and many critical writers chose, and were often forced, to stay out-
side—for example, Marx, Nietzsche, Rosa Luxemburg, Bertrand Russell,
Antonio Gramsci, I. F. Stone, and Frantz Fanon. But perhaps because of the
as yet not completely integrated relations of money and power, the univer-
sity has at times allowed some room for scholars who would transcend their
immediate class interests. Such eccentrics, though not many in number,
have formed an important history of their own, as we can see in our century
in Jun Tosaka, Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir,
Raymond Williams, C. Wright Mills, and E. P. Thompson, all deceased now.
There are others who are still active, yet the university as an institution has
served Caesar and Mammon all the while manifesting its fealty to Minerva,
Clio, and the Muses.

The three wars in the twentieth century—World War I, World War II,
and the cold war (which included the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam)—in-
tensified the proclivity of the university to serve the interests of the state.
Beginning with weapons research, such as the Manhattan Project, research
extended far beyond physics and chemistry, and engineering and biology,

11. Matthew Arnold, “Conclusion,” in Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 202–12.
12. Kerr, Uses of the University, 35.
to reach the humanities and the social sciences. Following the organization of the intelligence system (the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS), the humanities soon became far more broadly complicit with the formation of state/capitalist ideology. In literature, the fetishism of irony, paradox, and complexity helped to depoliticize, that is, to conceal capitalist contradictions, by invoking the “open-minded” distastiation of bourgeois modernism. The canon was devised and reinforced. In arts, abstract expressionism was promoted to counter Soviet realism, and in history, progress and development were the goal toward which democracy inexorably marched. In the United States at least, the social sciences have always been directed toward policy and utility. And by compartmentalizing the world into areas, area studies has mapped out national interests in both the humanities and the social sciences. Such nationalization of the university was slowly challenged after the 1960s, and by the end of the cold war, around 1990, the hegemony of the state was clearly replaced by the dominant power of the global market.

What separates Atkinson from Kerr is the end of the cold war and the globalization of the economy, two events that are merely two aspects of the same capitalist development. What, then, is this event, and how does it affect the university? Globalization is certainly not new: Capitalism has always looked for new markets, cheaper labor, and greater productivity everywhere, as Marx and Engels pointed out in the Manifesto of the Communist Party 150 years ago. The internationalization of trade between 1880 and World War I was proportionately as great as the current cross-border

trade. This time, however, expansion is thoroughly different in its intensity and magnitude as a result of the startling technological development and sheer volume of production.

Because of the phenomenal advance in communication and transportation since World War II, capital, labor, production, products, and raw materials circulate with unprecedented ease and speed in search of maximum profit across nations and regions, radically diminishing along the way local and regional differences. The state has always been in service for the rich and mighty, and yet it did, from time to time, remember that it had regulatory and mediatory roles. The state was not always exclusively their agency. Now, however, with the rise of immense multinational and transnational corporations, the state, with its interventionary power, has visibly declined. It cannot deter the dominant downsizing and cost-cutting trends that often produce acute pain and suffering among the workers. It cannot restrain the immense flow of cash and investment in the world. If anything, the state supports the corporate interest, as can be seen in its repeated drives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Untrammeled entrepreneurship and profiteering thus grow. And the extraordinary rejection of the public sector, totality, and communitarianism in favor of privatization, individualism, and identitarianism is pervasive. This results in a fierce intensification of competition, careerism, opportunism, and, finally, the fragmentation and atomization of society.

Environmentally, the earth has reached the point of no return for the human race. There is no longer a square inch left on earth that is not contaminated by industrial pollution. Environmental degradation is now irreversible: The only thing humans can do under the capitalist system is to try to slow down the rate of decay and to attempt a little local patchwork repair.

17. “One measure of the extent to which product markets are integrated is the ratio of trade to output. This has increased sharply in most countries since 1950. But by this measure Britain and France are only slightly more open to trade today than they were in 1913, while Japan is less open now than then” (see “One World?” Economist, 18 October 1997, 79–80).
19. For a recent concise survey, see Bill McKibben, “A Special Moment in History,” Atlan-
The most conspicuous social consequence of globalization, however, is the intensification of the gap between the rich and the poor. Globally, 80 percent of capital circulates among two dozen countries. Wealth is concentrated in the industrialized countries, and yet it continues to flow only in one direction, toward the North. To take just one example, Uganda’s income per capita is $200 a year—compared to $39,833 of the richest country, Luxembourg. The life expectancy in Uganda is forty-two years—compared to Japan’s eighty years—and one in five children there dies before the age of five. Finally, 20 percent of its population is now afflicted with HIV. And yet its annual debt service is twice the government’s spending on primary health. There are countries worse off than Uganda. The uneven distribution of wealth is indeed pervasive in every region. Thus 225 of the richest individuals have assets totaling $1 trillion, equal to the collective annual income of the poorest 47 percent of the human population ($2.5 billion), and these billionaires, though mostly concentrated in the North, include seventy-eight in developing countries.

The national picture is no better. The inequity in wages and incomes in the United States was widely discussed from 1995 to 1997. Although we don’t hear much about it nowadays, it does not mean the discrepancy is narrowing. Everyone knows the epic salary and stock options of Michael Eisner, CEO of Walt Disney Company, or the assets of Bill Gates. Twenty-five years ago, in 1974, CEOs of major American corporations were paid...
thirty-five times the wage of an average American worker. In 1994, com-
pen-sation for CEOs jumped to 187 times the pay of ordinary workers. According
to a special report in Business Week in 1998, the average executive pay is
now 326 times what a factory worker earns.24 This gap is greater than that
between Luxembourg and Uganda. Wealth is far more concentrated as the
income goes up—that is, between 1979 and 1995, the income of the bottom
20 percent fell by 9 percent, while the top 20 percent gained by 26 per-
cent.25 From 1992 to 1995, a recent three-year period in which household
net worth grew by more than $2.7 trillion, the richest 1 percent boosted their
share of the total from 30.2 percent to 35.1 percent. What’s more, almost
all of that gain accrued to the top half of that segment, a group that saw its
average net worth jump from $8 to $11.3 million. On the other hand, the bot-
90 percent of households slipped to just 31.5 percent, down from 32.9
percent.26 Although the unemployment rate has fallen dramatically recently,
many jobs are on a contingency basis—that is, part-time or temporary—
with no health and retirement benefits, even in the late spring of 1999, after
a long period of the so-called booming economy.27 The state does not inter-
vene: On the contrary, the tax structure,28 public works programs, defense
expenditures, health and welfare policies, and business deregulation are all
being reorganized on behalf of the rich and the corporate. The poor are left
to the paltry trickle down or simply to their own meager resources.

24. See the special report on executive pay, “The Good, the Bad, the Ugly of CEO Salaries
Scoreboard: Executive Compensation,” Business Week, 20 April 1998, 64–110, with con-
tributions by Jennifer Reingold, Richard A. Melcher, Gary McWilliams, and other bureau
reports. The figures for 1974 and 1994 are taken from the Web site of the House Demo-

What is interesting about this phenomenon is that the raise and option have very little
to do with the performance of the companies the executives manage. See Adam Bryant,
“Stock Options That Raise Investors’ Ire,” New York Times, 27 March 1998; Adam Bry-
ant, “Flying High on the Option Express;” New York Times, 5 April 1998; and Adam
ary 1997.


27. Robert B. Reich, “Despite the U.S. Boom, Free Trade Is Off Track,” Los Angeles Times,
18 June 1999.

Cay Johnston, “Tax Cuts Help the Wealthy in the Strong Economy,” New York Times,
5 October 1997.
Such an economy—transnational and all absorbing—obviously has effects on the university. The most structural and decisive change is the so-called technology transfer from the university to industry, accelerated with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. I will discuss it fully later, but let me start here with the obvious. In the specific curricula, nation-centered disciplines have been in decline, and area studies, too, has been reexamined since the end of the cold war. The studies of national literatures and histories, the cornerstone of the humanities for several generations, are visibly losing their attraction. The declining middle class sends its children to land-grant public institutions that cost less, while the rich send theirs to socially elite private institutions that take pride in their rising tuition. The richer students might be more inclined to study the humanities—as they traditionally did before World War II—while the poorer students, who need to support themselves by working at least part-time while in school, are prone to choose practical and useful majors that might lead to careers after graduation. The ruling class always likes to remain useless, while expecting the workers to be useful. And such political economy of student enrollment obviously affects the curriculum. The humanities suffer. Pure science—mathematics and physics, for instance—similarly languishes from diminished support. Thus academic programs are being discontinued, while disciplines in greater demand are being expanded—often regardless of their intellectual significance.

The so-called job crisis in the humanities is not a consequence of an economic downturn as it was, in fact, in the 1970s, nor is it a temporary event resulting from a demographic shift. The basis of national literatures and cultures is very much hollowed out, as the nation-state declines as the hegemonic imaginary. The humanities as they are now constituted in academia are no longer desired or warranted. There is a decisive change in the academic outlook and policy to de-emphasize the humanities and to shift resources to applied sciences. Culture—arts and literature—is being driven out of academia, just as in the old days, and has every sign of being reorganized into media, entertainment, and tourism—all consumer activities—that would be assigned a far more legitimate role in the emergent global economy. I will discuss this further in part 2.

30. In the fall of 1998, the Modern Language Association of America (MLA) published Profession 1998, a booklet “covering a range of topics of professional concern.” It is, how-
Aside from such vicissitudes in specific disciplines, the impact of global corporatization is clearest in the radical change in the general outlook and policy on academic productivity. The university is reexamined in terms of cost and output. Course enrollment, degree production, and Ph.D. placement are closely watched and policed, as if all such figures were industrial statistics. Scholarship is measured by quantified publication and citation record. More importantly, the development office dealing with grants and endowments is one of the most active parts of the university.

ever, hopelessly out of touch with the changing conditions of the profession and the global culture around it. Its last essay, “Bob’s Job: Campus Crises and ‘Adjunct’ Education,” by former president Sandra M. Gilbert, personalizes the historical transformation of today’s American culture into a memory of her friend Bob J. Griffin. Profoundly saddening, Bob’s death, however, demands a far more clear-headed analysis of the political economy of the United States in the 1990s than the episode of a man with a Ph.D. in English from UC Berkeley who died in his mid-sixties as a part-time composition teacher earning $15,000 without health insurance. The MLA seems committed to evading the real historical situation, thereby perhaps duplicating similar cases in the future as it keeps its operation. As another erstwhile friend of Bob’s, I feel the urgency of the need to face honestly the academic-professional situation today.

31. Placement statistics are, of course, indispensable. The question is, What to do with these figures? A recent MLA report finds that of the 7,598 Ph.D.’s in English and foreign languages earned between 1990 and 1995, 4,188—55 percent—failed to find a tenure-track job in the year the degree was awarded. The report then compares the job crisis to earlier crises and to those in other disciplines. The report readily recognizes the “pedagogical and professional—indeed, a cultural—crises of great magnitude.” It then points out that the current graduate program is mainly “aimed at the major research institution rather than a future in the community colleges, junior colleges, and small sectarian schools that now provide our profession with so large a proportion of its work.” Its subsequent recommendations—to cut the size of the graduate program, for instance—should be taken seriously. Yet the report hardly considers the changing nature of the humanities program, or rather of the university itself, which is at the root of this change in higher education. Even if all the funding crises were solved today, the crisis in the intellectual content of learning and teaching in higher education in the United States, or perhaps any other place, would not change. Suppose all the Ph.D.’s in the humanities were able to secure tenure-track positions this year. Would this solve the crisis of the content of the humanities teaching? See Final Report: MLA Committee on Professional Employment (New York: MLA, 1997). Reproduced in PMLA 113, no. 5 (October 1998): 1154–77.

32. “Harvard, with a $12.8 billion endowment, is in the middle of raising $2.1 billion more.” An economist asks if the university really needs $15 billion. An endowment, like any other property accumulation, turns into a “habit,” whether or not it is needed, and to whatever end. See Karen W. Arenson, “Modest Proposal,” New York Times, 2 August 1998.

presses—which used to publish scholarly monographs for the sake of the autonomous academic enterprise, not for profit but for scholarship—are now reorganizing their inventories to make themselves commercially self-supporting. Once, every university-press title had more than one thousand orders in a vanity-press setup, where "one group wrote, one published, and one bought the books: a comfortable circuit leading to secure and tenured jobs all around." Library orders have since been radically cut, now averaging below three hundred copies per title and falling. Whole academic areas, such as "literary criticism or Latin American history," are already being eliminated from university presses.33 The conventional trajectory of the completion of a doctoral dissertation, followed by its publication for tenure and another monograph for full professorship, is not likely to last much longer. Stanley Fish, professor of English, who also served as the director of Duke University Press, describes/prescribes that university presses "no longer think in terms of a 900 to 1,500 print run" but switch to those that "sell between 5,000 and 40,000 copies." Similarly, the director of the University of Minnesota Press ominously predicts that "in two years there will be hardly any monographs on the market."34

Academic downsizing is now accepted as inevitable.35 Instead of

33. Phil Pochoda, "Universities Press On," Nation, 29 December 1997, 11–16. See also Mark Crispin Miller, "The Crushing Power of Big Publishing," Nation, 17 March 1997, 11–18: "Meanwhile, the academic houses are now pressed by cost-conscious university administrators to make it on their own, without institutional subsidies. Thus those houses too are giving in to market pressure, dumping recondite monographs in favor of trendier academic fare or, better yet, whatever sells at Borders—which, presumably, means few footnotes. Those publishers are so hard pressed there’s talk in the academy of changing tenure rules, because it’s next to impossible to get an arcane study published—a dark development indeed" (17–18).


regular faculty, contingency instructors—graduate students and temporary hires without benefits and tenure—are shouldering a major portion of undergraduate teaching.\textsuperscript{36} Universities are making use of Internet Web sites for many undergraduate classes. The California Virtual University (CVU) has now been officially launched, offering hundreds of on-line courses through extension programs. The CVU involves both public and private institutions of higher education (the UC and California State University campuses, Stanford University, the University of Southern California, among others) to form a “global academic village,” as one of its planners calls it. As an instructional supplement, digital programs can, of course, be helpful. But the main objective of CVU lies elsewhere. Although distance learning has yet to replace human faculty and its popularity is indeed far from guaranteed, its money-saving potential is quite obvious. Numerous virtual universities are spreading across the nation and even the world: In addition to CVU, there are New York University’s profit-seeking subsidiary; Western Governors University; Pennsylvania State University’s “World Campus”; Florida State University; as well as Britain’s well-tested Open University.\textsuperscript{37} There is also a for-profit behemoth, the University of Phoenix, now the largest degree-granting private university in the United States, which employed, until a few years ago, just seven full-time faculty aided by thirty-four hundred part-time teachers who were paid $1,500 for teaching a course. The profit

\textsuperscript{36} “In the Ph.D.-granting [English] departments, graduate student instructors taught 63% of the first-year writing sections, part-timers 19%, and full-time non-tenure-track faculty members 14%, on average.” The corresponding figures in foreign-language departments are 68, 7, and 15 percent. See MLA, \textit{Final Report}, 8. A large number of Ph.D.’s from literature departments remain jobless, and for them even such temporary lectureships are highly desirable. See also Seth Mydans, “Part-Time College Teaching Rises, as Do Worries,” \textit{New York Times}, 4 January 1995; and Joseph Berger, “After Her Ph.D., a Scavenger’s Life: A Temp Professor among Thousands,” \textit{New York Times}, 8 March 1998.

\textsuperscript{37} Such commercial ventures, however, have not proven an immediate success. As of the fall of 1998, most universities—Penn State, SUNY, the University of Illinois, and UC Berkeley—have attracted fewer than five thousand students. To remedy the difficulties, NYU is planning to use a for-profit subsidiary to build its Internet capacity. In “N.Y.U. Sees Profits in Virtual Classes,” \textit{New York Times}, 7 October 1998, Karen W. Arenson writes, “Non-profit universities like N.Y.U. have increasingly turned to profit-making ventures to capitalize on their professors’ research.” See also the same reporter’s article, “More Colleges Plunging into Uncharted Waters of On-Line Courses,” \textit{New York Times}, 2 November 1998.
of the Apollo Group, which owns the University of Phoenix, is rising dramatically. There are resistance movements among the faculty who might be replaced by the growing digital simulacra. Thus nationally, institutions such as UCLA, the University of Maine, the University of Washington, and York University in Canada are testing the strength of faculty opposition.

To remain competitive in attracting students as well as grants and endowments, however, stellar professors are fiercely fought over: A dozen universities now have at least one faculty member who makes more than $750,000 in salary and benefits—very much like corporate CEOs who tower over hugely underpaid workers. The policy of forging alliances with industries is firmly in place on American campuses everywhere. Fearful of the disappearance of federal support, the universities not only are in search of corporate assistance but are aggressively forming joint research centers. In southern California alone, UC Irvine is building a biomedical center to facilitate the commercialization of university science and to aid the formation of companies. UCLA and USC each received $100 million from an entrepreneur to build a biomedical engineering center. Examples are endless, as we will see below.

Such close alliance unavoidably leads to a clubby intercourse between university and industrial managers. Thus many university presidents and chancellors sit on corporate boards, including the presidents of the University of Pennsylvania (Aetna Life and Casualty Company and Electronic

38. Lawrence Solely, “Higher Education . . . or Higher Profits? For-Profit Universities Sell Free Enterprise Education,” In These Times 22, no. 21 (20 September 1998): 14–17. “Because of questions raised by accreditors, the university increased the size of its full-time faculty—it now has 45 full-timers on board” (16). The Apollo Group, Phoenix’s parent corporation, has increased its revenues more than three times in five years, from $124,720,000 in FY 1994 to $391,082,000 in FY 1998. See also Apollo’s Web site, www.apollogrp.com.
39. See “California’s ‘Virtual University’ Aims to Be a Digital Center for Higher Education,” Notice: A Publication of the Academic Senate, University of California 22, no. 3 (December 1997): 1, 3; and “Notes from the Chair: Course Articulation,” Notice: A Publication of the Academic Senate, University of California 22, no. 7 (May 1998): 5. See also Kenneth R. Weiss, “A Wary Academia on Edge of Cyberspace” and “State Won’t Oversee Virtual University,” Los Angeles Times, 31 March 1998 and 30 July 1998, respectively. As for faculty opposition to the administrative downsizing via digitalization, see David Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New York: Penguin, 1999).
Data Submission Systems); Lehigh University (Parker Hannifin Corporation); Georgetown University (Walt Disney Company); UC Berkeley (Wells Fargo); Drew University (Aramark, Bell Atlantic, United HealthCare, Beneficial Corporation, Fiduciary Trust Company International, Amerada Hess Corporation); the University of Texas (Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc.); Occidental College (ARCO, IBM, Northrop Grumman Corporation); the University of California system (Consolidated Nevada Goldfields Corporation, Qualcomm Inc., and San Diego Gas and Electric/Enova Corporation); just to name a few. And many of these administrators receive sizable compensation in addition to their academic salaries (for example, the president of Penn received $200,000 in addition to her regular compensation of $514,878). Finally, Robert C. Dynes, who had left Bell Laboratories after twenty-two years of service as a researcher and manager to become the vice-chancellor under Atkinson at UC San Diego, produced a booklet called “Partners in Business” after he replaced Atkinson as the chancellor. At a breakfast meeting in 1996 of the San Diego Biocommerce Association (BIOCOM), Dynes remarked that basic research is no longer being conducted by major corporations and that universities are the source of new technologies. Before this talk, he was introduced by the BIOCOM board member as the “CEO” of UC San Diego. The emcee for the occasion was a UC regent, who also served on the committee that chose Dynes for the chancellorship of UC San Diego.

Conversely, many captains of industry have for generations served on university boards of trustees and regents. Veblen complained about this intrusion of the moneyed and powerful into the academic territory years back. There are other studies of university ownership in the early twentieth century. Although there may be a few exceptions, nearly all the trustees and regents of state universities are political appointments, making certain that the corporate interest be securely represented. In more recent days, the selection of the members of the governing board seems to be more


blatantly corporation oriented, although systematic studies, reflecting the general apathy of scholars, are not widely available, as far as I have been able to determine.\textsuperscript{44}

More importantly, the CEO has now become the only model for presidents and chancellors of universities. Harold T. Shapiro, president of Princeton University, for one, asserts that “university presidents are their institutions’ CEO.”\textsuperscript{45} The age-old tradition of choosing a college president for his scholarship, vision, character, or even political or military fame is irretrievably gone for now. At least for the foreseeable future, the academic head is a corporate manager who is expected to expand the institutional and corporate base and alliance, build intellectual property, raise funds and endowments, increase labor productivity, finesse the public relations with external organizations, including various governmental agencies, and run the machinery with dexterity. The university-corporation identification cannot be much closer.\textsuperscript{46}

\ldots

Let me turn at this point to the issue that is central to the structural transformation of the knowledge industry, that is, today’s practice of university “technology transfer.” Atkinson’s remarks cited at the beginning of this essay are neither exceptional nor extreme, although they are rhetorically more explicit and less guarded than most in today’s academic world. Similar views are being expressed by administrators of higher education—his neighbor, Gerhard Casper, president of Stanford, for one—\textsuperscript{47}—and they

\textsuperscript{44} Charles L. Schwartz, Professor Emeritus of physics at UC Berkeley, single-handedly studied the conduct of the UC regents over many years, but after a score of detailed reports, he recently gave up his efforts, partly, at least, as a result of lack of support and encouragement.


accurately express the policies and practices of most research universities in the United States now.

On 12 December 1980, Senators Birch Bayh and Bob Dole passed a bipartisan bill, the Bayh-Dole Act (Public Law 96-517), the Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980. This law was written in response to the prospects of an intensifying global economic competition, a feared (though not actual) cutback in federal research funding, pressure toward corporate downsizing, including R & D, and the resultant greater need of academic research. During the years of the Reagan-Thatcher economy, the use of public resources for private enterprises was fast gaining respect and significance. The law, as it has been since repeatedly revised, enables universities to commercialize—that is, to own, patent, and retain title to inventions developed from federally funded research programs. Universities and research institutions could at first commercialize through non-profit start-ups or small national companies, but later through any businesses, regardless of size or nationality. Prior to 1980, fewer than 250 patents were granted to institutions each year, whereas in FY 1996, over 2,000, and in FY 1997, over 2,740, patents (up by 26 percent) were granted. Since 1980, more than 1,500 start-up companies, including 333 in FY 1997 (up 34 percent from 246 in FY 1996), have been formed on technologies created at universities and research institutions. The revenues, in the form of licenses, equity, options, fees, and so forth, are still relatively small. Total gross license income received from licenses and options of the respondents to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) in FY 1997 was only $698.5 million. (Still, it was up 18 percent from 591.7 million in FY 1996, which in turn was up 19.6 percent from $494.7 million in FY 1995. That is, there has been an “exponential” increase in technology licensing activities.) Although the direct revenues constitute merely a fraction of the total university budget, or even of the university-sponsored research expenditures (from 1 to 5 per-

(11 March 1998), MIT President Charles M. Vest stated, “Universities should work synergistically with industry; they must not be industry” (available at www.house.gov/science/ vest_03-11.htm).

University-industry relations are far more conjoined than usually understood. First, start-up companies form a satellite R & D community, providing students and graduates, for instance, with jobs and training, while the companies receive information and technology from the universities. Also, academic licensing is said to have supported 250,000 high-paying jobs and generated $30 billion in the American economy in FY 1997 (compared to 212,500 jobs and $24.8 billion in the previous year). Second, some of the university-related labs and companies grow into corporations that then form industrial research parks such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, Research Triangle (Duke, University of North Carolina, and North Carolina State University), Princeton Corridor, Silicon Hills (Texas), the Medical Mile (Penn and Temple University), Optics Valley (University of Arizona), and the Golden Triangle (UC San Diego). These are the late-twentieth-century campus landscapes that have replaced the Gothic towers of Heidelberg with their duels, songs, and romance, or Oxford and Cambridge with their chapels, pubs, and booksellers.

The competition among universities for a larger share in R & D resources is fervent in search of both project grants and license incomes themselves and the prestige that comes with being among the top research universities. The UC system is by far the largest research university, with sponsored research expenditures surpassing $1.6 billion, followed by Johns Hopkins University at $942 million and MIT at $713 million in FY 1997.\textsuperscript{51} In gross license income, too, UC leads at $67.3 million, followed by Stanford ($51.8 million), Columbia University ($50.3 million), and MIT ($21.2 million). UC is also a major recipient of federal research dollars, attracting over 10 percent of all federal funds spent on research in American universities ($12.3 billion in FY 1996).\textsuperscript{52} It must be remembered that these federal funds


\textsuperscript{52} See, however, note 4 above.
generate university inventions that are then licensed or contracted to commercial developers. (The corresponding figure for industrial sources in FY 1996 is $1.5 billion, a little over one-tenth of the federal funding.) In the middle of this heightened economic activity, the university faculty (“inventors”) earn from 25 to 50 percent—depending on the amount and institutions—of the license royalties from the institutions in whose names the research is conducted and the patents are issued. According to Atkinson, UC is “an $11.5 billion-a-year enterprise. The State of California contributes about two billion of that $11.5 billion, which means that for every dollar the State provides we generate almost five dollars in other funds.” Isn’t this the source of his conviction regarding the future of the research university of the United States or the world?

Concerning the transfer of federally funded research results to industry, the conversion of nonprofit scholarship to for-profit R & D might well be deemed justifiable on the grounds that inert federal funds are being used and activated by private developers for public benefits. The private sector makes profits, thereby expanding the economic base; students receive direct training, too. Thus the university is made directly serviceable to the public. The high-tech inflow may be said to result in a sharp rise in living standards and the urbanization of an area, benefiting the entire community around the university and the research park, as mentioned above.

There are, however, a number of traps and snares that enthusiastic administrators and policymakers are all too eager to ignore. First, the emphasis on patenting, that is, the conversion of knowledge into intellectual property, means the exclusion of others from sharing the knowledge. The fear of public disclosure that would nullify the commercial possibility of a patent and licensing income hampers the free flow of information that would be facilitated by the conventional means of papers in scholarly journals. Federal sponsorship ought to offer wide-open access to all discoveries and inventions created under it. Patenting delays the dissemination of information, and the principle of free inquiry is compromised. “Communication

53. The distribution of license revenues varies from university to university. The University of Michigan gives to the inventor(s): 50 percent up to $200,000, 33\(\frac{1}{3}\) percent above $200,000 (University of Michigan Technology Management Office, “Working with Faculty and Staff” [unpublished document]). The University of California rate is more flexible (UC Office of Technology Transfer, “UC Equity Policy,” 16 February 1996, available at www.ucop.edu/ott/equi-pol.html).

54. Atkinson, “Future of the University of California.”
among researchers suffers, when 'the rules of business precede the rules of science'; colleagues become unwilling to share their data." 55

Second, the real beneficiaries of academic technological inventions are not consumers and general taxpayers but corporations and entrepreneurs who often reap enormous profits through less-than-equitable pricing. If the Bayh-Dole Act was meant to make federally funded inventions available to the public at large, such an intention is not always fulfilled. Let me cite two instances of the abuse of federal funding. One of the most notorious cases is the 1993 agreement between the Scripps Research Institute and Sandoz, an aggressive Switzerland-based biotechnology multinational corporation. In exchange for a grant of $300 million, Scripps gave Sandoz a major role in its Joint Scientific Council, access to research findings even before notifying the funding agency (the National Institutes of Health [NIH]), and licenses for marketing Scripps's entire discoveries, all funded by the federal government to the tune of $1 billion. The deal was investigated by a congressional subcommittee, and Scripps and Sandoz were eventually forced to scale down the contract. Scripps may not be strictly a university, but it is a degree-granting academic institution. A very similar agreement was made between Sandoz and the Dana-Farber Institute, a Harvard teaching hospital. For a $100 million grant, Dana-Farber gave Sandoz the rights to colon-gene research that had been funded by the U.S. government. 56 Further, the agreement stipulates that anyone who accepts Sandoz money must give Sandoz licensing rights to their research findings. Corporations are saving a huge amount of money by letting universities conduct research and are reaping the profits by investing a relatively meager amount in fees and royalties. Their funding of some aspects of the research is far from ample or sufficient. Shouldn't a portion of the corporate profit be returned to the public, that is, the taxpayers?

Just as alarming as the uses made of federally funded research is the problem of conflict of interest and/or commitment—inasmuch as it involves

56. Lawrence C. Soley, Leasing the Ivory Tower: The Corporate Takeover of Academia (Boston: South End, 1995), 41-42. I became aware of the book late in my writing of this essay. Like Soley's virtual university article, the book has good episodic information concerning aspects of the corporatization of the university. Kristi Coale's article, "The $50 Million Question," Salon Magazine, 15 October 1998, updates the Scripps deal, reporting that the agreement was detected by the NIH and that Scripps was forced to scale it back to $20 million annually for five years.
the question of academic integrity, free intellectual inquiry, and academic freedom. A case that is not a direct instance of technology transfer and yet is closely related to the topic suggests the risks of the university-industry alliance. In April 1998, a task force was formed by Atkinson to look into the legitimacy of the active UC faculty to pursue professional interests outside the university. The dean of the College of Natural Resources, a professor of business, a professor of economics, and a professor of law, all from the UC Berkeley campus, had together formed a legal and economic consulting firm called the Legal and Economic Consulting Group (LECG). According to the official newsletter of the UC Academic Senate, the San Francisco Chronicle discovered that the member of the firm who earned the least stood to own $14 million in LECG stock after the initial public offering, while the member who earned the most received $33 million in stock. Academics from across the country serve as consultants for the firm, and several have significant connections in Washington, D.C. The law professor has been a senior economist on the Council of Economic Advisors, and another law professor from UC Berkeley is a major shareholder currently on leave while serving as the deputy assistant attorney general for antitrust at the Justice Department, a job the economist in the group previously held. One of the firm’s principals is Laura D’Andrea Tyson, the dean of the UC Berkeley Haas School of Business. She served, one recalls, in the first Clinton administration, first as chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, then as national economic adviser to the president and chair of the National Economic Council. The firm has wide-ranging expertise in areas such as antitrust, environmental and natural resource economics, intellectual property, international trade and policy, and privatization, among many others. The firm’s clients include not only large corporations but also the governments of such countries as Argentina, Japan, and New Zealand. The dean, Gordon Rausser, sees no conflict of interest or of commitment, while the university administration announces that “it not only accepts, but encourages outside professional work by its faculty, as such work provides two-way benefits.”

A conflict of commitment par excellence as I see it, the case divides the jury between those who believe that what one does in one’s free time is no one else’s business and those who dispute the presumed divisibility of one’s commitment. Legally, the distribution of work in an academic employee’s

58. “Some universities state that the ‘academic year salary’ covers 80% of the faculty member’s time during the nine months of the academic year. Faculty are free to consult ‘up
time schedule (company time versus private time) is nearly impossible to ascertain (don't the minds wander?), while ethically, the direct and full-scale commercialization of scholarly expertise clearly challenges the idea of a university as a site of free inquiry. In fact, tension is palpable between old-fashioned “pure” scientists and “future-oriented” entrepreneurial faculty in many research universities nowadays.

The second conflict-of-interest case—and another example of technology transfer—also concerns the division of one’s interest, time, and energy between nonprofit scholarship and for-profit R & D. Gordon Rausser, the same enterprising dean of the College of Natural Resources, UC Berkeley, is involved in another case, this one concerning Sandoz, which has now merged with Ciba-Geigy and is renamed Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, the world’s largest biotech firm. The deal is similar to the Sandoz-Harvard partnership. A new Novartis subsidiary, the La Jolla–based Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc., will pay $25 million to UC for research in plant genomics, housekeeping, and graduate-student stipends at the college. In exchange, Novartis will receive first rights to negotiate licenses for 30 to 40 percent of the research products. Research will be guided by a committee of three Novartis scientists and three UC Berkeley faculty members. Another committee, which will determine which projects to fund, will consist of three UC Berkeley faculty and two Novartis scientists. This is the first research agreement ever made between an entire instructional department of a university and a for-profit corporation. Is this university-industry alliance what was intended by the framers of the 1980 act? Is the public the beneficiary of the released research results? Or the Swiss multinational and the UC entrepreneurs? Is the public private, and the private public? At any rate, the cumulative effects of such research preferences will have a profound and lasting effect on the nature of university learning.

It should also be noted that genetically engineered corn produced by Novartis in Germany has cross-pollinated with nearby natural corn, stirring up a storm of protests in Europe. Future problems involving academic freedom are predictable. As if to preempt such fears of infringement, the vice-chancellor for research at UC Berkeley stated, “This research collaboration was arrived at in an open process that was highly sensitive to the public's interest.”

---

To 20% of the time (usually understood to be one day per week) during the academic year. Payment for the “summer months” is often under a separate arrangement.” See Council on Governmental Relations, “University Technology Transfer: Questions and Answers,” 30 November 1993, available at www.cogr.edu/qu.htm.
lic interest and to traditional campus concerns for academic freedom.” The CEO of the La Jolla Novartis, on the other hand, expressed his view: “This research is, in my view, the final statement in academic freedom. It’s not just the freedom to wish you could do something, it’s the resources that give you the freedom to actually do it.” It is quite obvious that this man doesn’t know that academic freedom is a concept different from free enterprise in academia. As of this writing, a proposed $25 million lab to be provided by Novartis for UC Berkeley and the appointment of Novartis scientists to adjunct professorships at UC Berkeley are still being discussed. Since the negotiation was made public, there have been several protests, including those from graduate students of the College of Natural Resources. The faculty at large, including the Academic Senate, however, have not as yet been heard from.59

Universities—presumably nonprofit—are thus now engrossed with forming partnerships with business. They seek greater funds and resources that will generate marketable intellectual property, which will in turn benefit academia and business. The cycle will be repeated by the corporations that repay the universities in grants and funds. Take the example of the University of Chicago. As UC, Stanford, and Columbia compete for the leadership in licensing their technology, Chicago, which has no engineering school, saw its national rank in science funding sink over two decades from among the top ten universities to about the top twenty. To catch up, Chicago launched, in 1986, an in-house venture-capital operation. Called ARCH Development Corporation, it is a joint venture with Argonne National Laboratory to “cultivate an expanded community” of administrators, faculty, “potential CEOs, consultants, associates, and investors.” The director of its biomedical operation, hired from Harvard, has replaced 50 percent of his

department heads, and the place, according to him, is now staffed “with entrepreneurial people responsible both for raising funds and for turning out actual products.” The head of the operation talks of “a new ethic”: “I’ve told the faculty they have an additional responsibility to go beyond the discovery of new knowledge. . . . No longer is the job description to sit in your laboratory and think, and expect me to provide all the resources.”

The University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University together have formed Innovation Works, Inc. to provide start-up funding grants to help with R & D, marketing, and other business support services. UC has its own BioSTAR (Biotechnology Strategic Targets for Alliances in Research), which similarly seeks to draw private investments for biological studies. It has the MICRO program for microelectronics and the computer industry, and also has plans to establish several more system-wide programs dedicated to engineering and communication technology. Its Office of Technology Transfer, both system-wide and campus-specific, guides the practical application of the results of university research by matching them to active license seekers. “The resulting licensing income provides an incentive to University inventors and authors [i.e., faculty and researchers] to participate in the complex technology transfer process [i.e., sales], funds further University research, and supports the operation of the University technology transfer program.”

Each campus has its own programs, such as San Diego’s Connect, which facilitates the contact and matchup between the campus and local industries. The California State University System, Stanford, USC, and the California Institute of Technology, just to mention Californian institutions, each has a project, and all these ventures show signs of a growing synergic relationship between industry and academia.

The bureaucracy reproduces and expands itself, as Pierre Bourdieu would observe,

62. UC Office of Technology Transfer, “UC Equity Policy.”
64. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relations to Culture, trans. Richard Nice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); and, with Jean-
agers. University administration is now a steady growth industry, far out-
pacing the conventional scholars in every discipline. “Historically,” says the
director of industrial partnerships and commercialization for Lawrence Live-
ermore National Laboratory, “we were a closed place until about five years
ago. But now we are more interested in maximizing the bang for buck.”
From the East Coast to the West, from America to Japan, from Australia to
Europe, the transformation of academia is indisputable now in nearly all the
institutions that are capable of attracting corporate interests.

Not a matter of technology transfer, though certainly related, direct
corporate involvement in academic research threatens to intensify the con-
flict of interest and jeopardize the integrity of scholarly projects and judg-
ments. Sheldon Krimsky, professor of urban and environmental policy at
Tufts University, surveyed 789 articles on biology and genetics published in
1992 in fourteen leading journals in the field. The articles were written by
life scientists from nonprofit research institutions in the state of Massachu-
etts. Authors were defined as having a financial interest if they (1) were
listed on a patent or patent application; (2) served on a scientific advisory
committee of a biotech company developing a related product; or (3) served
as an officer or shareholder of a company with commercial ties to the re-
search. Krimsky’s discovery was that 34 percent of the articles examined
had a financial interest in the described research. Consultancies and honoraria were not included because they are impossible to trace. When these factors are considered, he believes that the percentage is likely to be much higher.  

The conflict-of-interest issue is far from clear-cut. Does financial involvement in itself necessarily destroy the validity of a scientific finding? Stock ownership? Should all financial activities be disclosed? There are many scientists who believe otherwise. Kenneth J. Rothman, a professor of public health at Boston University and editor of the journal *Epidemiology*, wrote in the *Journal of the American Medical Association* that "while disclosure may label someone as having a conflict of interest, it does not reveal whether there actually is a problem with the work or whether the implicit prediction is a 'false positive.'" He called it the "new McCarthyism in science." Since 1992, several journals—the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, *Science*, the *Lancet*, the *New England Journal of Medicine*, and the *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*—have adopted a policy of financial disclosure, while others—such as *Nature*—ignore disclosure as unneeded. The latter group insists that the work should be evaluated for itself, not for the author’s affiliation, thus virtually erasing the idea of the perceived conflict of interest. Will this interpretation initiate a radical departure from the accustomed legal concept?  

There are numerous complex cases involving at least "perceived conflict" that indeed would require minute contractual details just to be nominally accurate. A satisfactory presentation of such cases here will sidetrack this essay from its main thrust, and I would simply refer to the literature listed in the footnotes. A few broad samples might suggest a general pic-


ture: A journal editor and university professor accepts and rejects articles evaluating a pharmaceutical product in which he/she is financially involved, and all the rejected pieces question the product, while the accepted ones support it; a researcher praises a drug produced by a company in which he is heavily invested; a climatologist denies global warming while not disclosing that he is paid by oil companies as well as the government of an oil-exporting country; corporate sponsors—pharmaceutical companies, for instance—insist on the rights to review, revise, and approve the research reports. Many pressures are successfully resisted, but not always. After all, the development of effective medicines is extremely costly, and since federal and public funding is not always available, industrial research funds are avidly sought. Some projects will bring huge benefits to public health, as well. Nevertheless, the eventual importance of a final product does not safeguard the project from vulnerabilities to compromise. And while most funds are legitimate and honorable, intensified commercialization of research obviously opens more chances of jeopardy.

Finally, does high-tech corporatization benefit the public around the university? Certainly, the industry enjoys the low-cost R & D, funded by the federal taxpayers and offered by the university. The university managers who often sit on the corporate boards receive some remuneration and satisfaction. True also, a good number of start-ups—one out of four—grow into successful companies, and even those that fail can retry, and their trained employees can find positions elsewhere. But what about outside the “business community”? Science parks undoubtedly generate jobs and incomes. The inflow of high-wage researchers contributes to the growth of shops and markets, in turn creating business in service industries. On the other hand, such rapid urbanization means a steep climb in real-estate values, leading to sprawling housing developments and resulting in traffic congestion. This sets off a vicious circle of further sprawl, traffic jams, and, above all, environmental deterioration. And the infrastructural maintenance for such a development must be entirely funded by the local and state taxpayers. Regarding the corrosive effect of Silicon Valley’s indifference toward its surrounding area, an observer has this to say: “The average home price in San Mateo County is more than $400,000; in Santa Clara County, it’s nearly that high. Most of the workforce that drives the high-tech engine spends hour

after hour commuting to and from another valley—the Central Valley—because that's where the workers can find affordable housing. Polluted air, overcrowded schools and a yawning disparity between haves and have-nots—all are waste products of high-tech's economic internationalism.”

Unlike some older cities—say, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or Portland, Oregon—which have grown over decades and centuries, repeatedly adjusting economy and civilization to geography, the high-tech research parks lack the needed softening elements of life, such as walks, parks, landmarks, theaters, old shopping districts, plazas—the space for flaneurs. Instead, shopping malls with their sham–public spaces offer the only meeting ground to the young and to grown-ups alike. Shouldn't the university provide a place for rethinking all this before it's too late?

The corporatization of a university means its globalization in the current economic situation, since crucial corporations are typically transnational. Universities are networked through countless international ties. It is practically impossible, for instance, to find a scholar in any university in any industrial country who has not spent an extensive period of time in at least one foreign institution, either as a student or as a scholar. Visits, exchanges, and conferences are routines of academic life. Publications are often collaborative and transnational, and their circulation is worldwide. Third World engineers and intellectuals are welcomed in the metropolis. Awards such as the Fields Medal and the Pritzker, Kyocera, and Nobel Prizes are, of course, global, as are, increasingly, key academic appointments. Foreign students, once pursued for geopolitical reasons, are now actively recruited for the tuition they bring from rich families in the Third World. Sources of research funding—institutional funding, project support, endowment of chairs, grants, and fellowships—are often cross-border, as we have already seen. This development obviously contributes to a greater circulation of information and understanding along with capital and technology, helping to erase regional and cultural misapprehension and misrepresentation. And it indeed has salutary aspects.

One danger that cannot be ignored altogether, however, is the emergence of a global academic industry that powerfully attracts and absorbs scholars and students. The industry is far from a “village” envisioned by the administrators of the virtual university; rather, it is a de-territorialized cor-

Poration. Transnational scholars, now career professionals, organize themselves into an exclusionary body that has little to do with their fellow citizens, either in their places of origin or arrival, but has everything to do with the transnational corporate structure. As it expands, Novartis is the global model swallowing up administrators, professors, researchers, and graduate students. English, the lingua franca of business, is their standard language. For generations, the goal of the humanities and the social sciences has been advertised as the investigation, interpretation, and criticism of social, cultural, and political relations. But now reality seems to have finally caught up with this facade. The huge impact of the global information and knowledge industry on academic learning that would and should be the most urgent topic of concern was hardly discussed, or even acknowledged, by scholars in the humanities or the social sciences until recent days. Once globalization discourse began, however, terms such as globalization and transnational—together with multiculturalism—have been spreading like any other commodity. In the process, it is being compartmentalized, sheltered, sanitized, and made tame and safe by experts, as if globalization discourse is itself a thriving cultural and intellectual activity. Although some minimal room is still left for serious inquiry and criticism in academia, such space is rapidly shrinking, and the ranks of independent eccentrics are fast thinning. This failure of professors in these “un-applied” divisions of learning to discuss and intervene in the ongoing commercialization of the university is becoming painfully glaring—at least to some observers. What are the intellectual factors that have brought about such a failure? And what are the external circumstances that have promoted this failure? The deafening silence?

2. The Failure of the Humanities as an Agency of Criticism and Intervention

for instance, adds new chapters that are deeply worried about the privatization and corporatization of the university. *Academic Capitalism*, by Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie, published in 1998, observes that “the freedom of professors to pursue curiosity-driven research was curtailed by withdrawal of more or less autonomous funding to support this activity and by the increased targeting of R & D funds for commercial research.” It even predicts that “faculty not participating in academic capitalism will become teachers rather than teacher-researchers, work on rolling contracts rather than having tenure, and will have less to say in terms of the curriculum or the direction of research universities.”[72] And yet these books, solely concerned with the institutional economy, have nothing whatever to say on the humanities, as if this branch of learning had already vanished. On the other hand, books by such humanities scholars as W. B. Carnochan, David Damrosch, William V. Spanos, John Beverley, Michael Bérubé and Cary Nelson, and Neil Postman[73] have hardly anything specific to say with respect to the entrepreneurial transformation of the university and its impact on the humanities. The two sides are oblivious to each other. Slaughter and Leslie prophesy that “the concept of the university as a community of scholars will disintegrate further,” but the disintegration has already taken place.[74]

---

In order to reflect on the circumstances around the retreat of the humanities from the line of intellectual and political resistance, I would like to draw here a thumbnail sketch of the postwar intellectual transformation, keeping a close eye on the gradual rejection of the idea of totality and universality in favor of diversity and particularity among the “progressive” humanities scholars. This ideological shift seeks to rectify enlightenment collectivism, and it is no doubt salubrious. At the same time, it must be recognized that the idea of multiplicity and difference parallels—in fact, endorses—the economic globalization as described in part 1 of this essay.

To return to the 1960s, the worldwide student rebellion was obviously not a unified response to cognate historical events. Mexico City, Paris, Berkeley, and Tokyo each had different contingencies traceable to different histories. And yet there were certain circumstances that underlay most, if not all, of the campus uprisings: the pervasive effect of the independence movements in the Third World; anger and guilt over colonialism and racism; a generational challenge by students born after World War II; an intense revulsion to cold war repression both in the East and the West; the newly aroused skepticism about dominant central power, ranging from patriarchy and sexism to statism and straight sex; the growth of the counterculture in defiance of high arts; and, finally, the rejection of Euramerican modernism and enlightenment foundationalism. Such revolts varied in configuration and consequence from society to society, but they were present in some form or other on these strife-torn campuses throughout the world. Further, in a tightening circle of globality, the regional events were interconnected and convergent.

Among the French intellectuals, the consequences of the liberation movements in Vietnam and Algeria were deep and wide, while their historical alliance with Soviet communism was being shattered by Khrushchev’s revelation of Stalinism in 1956 and the Soviet intervention in Hungary that same year and Czechoslovakia later on. Marxist humanism was the first to be interrogated after the horrors of postwar discoveries began to sink in to European minds. Such skepticism called into question universality of any kind, including Eurocentricity, proposing “difference” as the cognitive framework, and “differance” as the strategy. Language was the limits beyond which “reality” was gradually banished as inaccessible. The postmodern turn thus commenced.

After World War II, the preeminent intellectual had been Sartre, whose Marxist commitment to humanism, universality, and collectivism was, in fact, already attenuated by his existentialist rejection of the essence and by his at least dormant structuralism. And yet for Claude Lévi-Strauss,
whose ethnology replaced Sartrean existential humanism as the most
hegemonic of French thoughts, it was the Saussurean linguistic model of
difference that was interpreted as providing the ground for liberation egalitarianism. His perceived abandonment of totality as well as universalism,
derived as it was from a profound disillusionment with collectivism, centralism, and enlightenment humanism, was instrumental in generating various
schools of structuralism and poststructuralism. According to Lévi-Strauss,
“Civilization implies the coexistence of cultures offering among themselves
the maximum of diversity, and even consists in this very coexistence.” 75
His epistemology of difference that led to the recognition and maintenance of
diversity and plurality was powerfully enabling to Third Worldism, Maoism (an
alternative Marxism), feminism, antiracism, anti-Orientalism, and antitotalitarianism. More importantly, his challenge to totality and to Eurocentricity
had an impact on every branch of learning, from anthropology and sociology, to art, literature, history, politics, and law, among the students and the
now dominant poststructuralist theorists, such as Jacques Lacan, Roland
Barthes, Louis Althusser, Paul de Man, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida.

Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism was a response to the rupture of the
long-established tradition of Eurocentricity, and it has played an immensely
important role in intellectual history not only in France but also nearly everywhere else in the world to this day. However, it also introduced problems of
its own, whose culminating aftermath is now beginning to be felt in this age
of the global economy. First, Lévi-Strauss’s anthropology is, as the title of
one of his later books indicates, “the view from afar,” because to maintain
the diversity of cultures, one should not/cannot intimately identify with any.
The result is not only a propensity toward exoticism and superficial knowl-
dge, but uninvolvelement, laissez-faire, and indifference regarding the other.
Second, diverse cultures are equally unique and autonomous in the sense
that there are no common terms in which to compare them: He points out,
for instance, “the absurdity of declaring one culture superior to another.” 76
Does he mean that cultures, and ages, should be/are always equally desir-
able or undesirable? Cognitive relativism is unavoidable, and solipsism and randomness ensue. Third, in Saussurean linguistics, which is construed as
based on the lexicographic system of difference, a sign is understood in its

76. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 354.
relation to other signs but not to its referent. In Lévi-Strauss's application, reference is inevitably lost, and thus “truth” is assumed to be unrepresentable. The world is now shifted to texts, and history to narratives. Fourth, every culture or age has its own unique terms and discourses, which are thus judged incommensurable across the cultural and historical borders. Fifth, to the extent that the discreteness of diverse cultures is presumed, each individual subject born into a culture is regarded as inescapably determined by it. This is an impossible contradiction to his basic premise of difference, which denies totality and collectivity (is a given culture an undifferentiated totality?); but, more significantly, the subjectship—the individual agency—is disallowed so as to make any political engagement impossible. Finally, because of this erasure of political agency, the diversity of cultures paradoxically surrenders to the hegemonic center once again—very much as in the so-called global “borderless” economy.

Obviously, this is a simplification, and it might well be called an American literary and critical interpretation of the transmigration of French structuralism/poststructuralism. Also, the rejection of universality, collectivity, reference, and agency in favor of difference, particularity, incommensurability, and structure can hardly be uniform among the poststructuralists. And yet, as seen in the context of the theorists in the United States, there is an undeniable common proclivity among them to fundamentally reject such totalizing concepts as humanity, civilization, history, and justice, and such subtotalities as a region, a nation, a locality, or even any smallest group. As if breathing together the zeitgeist of division and difference, they each believe that foundational ideas and concepts are historical and cultural constructs—as represented by Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigm”77 or Foucault’s “episteme”—and that no all-inclusive judgment or causal explanation can be found. The fear of totality as inevitably totalitarian remains unabated. The theory of difference is not limited to history but extends to social and cultural relations. A totality is differentiated as a majority and minorities, then a minority into subminorities, a subminority into sub-subminorities, and so on. Differentiation and fragmentation never stop by the sheer force of its logic. Such precise identification is a beneficial calibration in the face of crude generalizations that obliterate the distinctions that exist in any category. It helps to fight marginalization and erasure. Yet if the strategy of division and fragmentation is not contained and moderated with the idea of a totality—

its context—it may very well lose its initial purpose and end up paradoxically in universal marginalization.

An individual, a group, or a program requires a totality in which to position itself. Conversely, a totality is not always a monolithic system for the suppression of all differences and marginalities. Specifics and particulars negotiate at all levels with the context and with other specifics and particulars. Likewise, all concepts and ideas may be bound to a specific locale in time and place, but a specific locale in time and place does not produce uniform and identical concepts and ideas. Further, essentialism would be equally present and absent in both totality and particularity.

The contradiction, or antinomy, between totality and particularity is most clearly demonstrated in a debate between Noam Chomsky and Foucault, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power," held in 1974. Their disagreement becomes palpable in the second half of the debate, where they argue about the notion of justice. For Foucault, justice is a historical and social invention "as an instrument of a certain political and economical power or as a weapon against that power," whereas for Chomsky, it should have/has "an absolute basis... residing in fundamental human qualities." Foucault disagrees with Chomsky's old-fashioned enlightenment metanarrative on the grounds that it is just one discourse among many. Chomsky speaks not only as a universalist intellectual here but also as one who is committed to the struggle for the suppressed of the world. Chomsky indeed believes that truth and falsehood can be distinguished and that the individual as the subjective agent has a moral responsibility. For Foucault, such claims are merely functions of the desire for power. Chomsky, on the other hand, detects in the Foucauldian abandonment of justice and the truth a cynicism that conceals a moral and political failure behind an elaborate intellectual sophistry.78

The theory of difference has been far more enthusiastically embraced in the United States, Canada, and Australia than in European countries because of its long history of a settlement society par excellence, where heterogeneous races and ethnicities have “coexisted” geographically. The university rebellion of the 1960s began, as we have already seen, with the Civil Rights movement in the late fifties and early sixties, and with the rising protest against the war in Vietnam. Further, the United States was founded on the long history of genocide and slavery, whose effects have not yet been erased even in this late date of 2000. More recently, the global economy, as we have already seen, has vastly intensified migration and exchange, and the promise and the problem of difference have been daily encountered and accommodated. Thus multiculturalism is the urgent issue both of pedagogy and political economy in the university in the United States.

Multiculturalism that rejects the discrimination of marginal groups is a democratic improvement over the majoritarian monopoly that had long suppressed all but dominant history and culture. Under multiculturalism, all sections and factions can claim fair inclusion and representation, and there have been signs of success in several actual social programs. Affirmative action is a practical program rooted in a version of multiculturalism that has resulted in an increased participation of women and minorities in both industry and the university. The representation is still far from equitable, and yet one should remember how complete the exclusion of the peripheries was a mere generation ago. Before proceeding to celebration, however, one needs to face the problems. First, there are the revived challenges to the legality of the affirmative action laws that threaten to reduce enrollment of women and minorities once again. Though protected by the present federal laws, the future of such programs of redress is far from assured. And let me repeat once more: The equalization and inclusion of marginals are still far from adequate in any social category.

More crucially, contradictory currents that converge in the program of multiculturalism itself must be noted: the greater recognition of alterities, on the one hand, and the exclusionist reaffirmation of self-identity, on the other. The former is the official line of multiculturalism by which the world is perceived to be diverse and one’s place to be within this plurality. The principles of diversity and plurality demand that one’s own ethnicity or iden-
tity be deemed to be no more than just one among many. If this requirement of equal limitation and discipline were accepted by all members of the “global community,” multiculturalism would make great strides toward the realization of a fair and just human community. Self-restriction, however, is seldom practiced for the betterment of general and abstract human welfare—especially when it involves material discipline and sacrifice for the parties involved. Besides, multiculturalism premised on all particularities of all categories—ethnicity to class, region to development, gender to nationality, poverty to wealth, race to age—is infinitely varied, and even in this age of cross-border mobility, no one is expected to know intimately more than an infinitesimal portion of such variety. Picture the variations: aged and impoverished white lesbian women, rich Korean men who speak no English, gay middle-class Lebanese-American males who are newly jobless with no families. However imaginative, sympathetic, or concerned, one is severely restricted in the ability to know and embrace others. The view is bound to be “from afar.” When the difference—gap—in wealth is widening, as now, the cross-categorical understanding becomes still more difficult. And the harder the likelihood of coeval encounter proves, the louder the cry for multiculturalism rises. The abstract principle of multiculturalism, an expression of liberal open-mindedness and progressive tolerance, much too often stands in for an alibi to exonerate the existing privileges, inequities, and class differences.

Two other possible perils are inherent in the program of difference and multiplicity. First, very much like industrial globalization, multiculturalism is preoccupied with the facade of internationalism and cosmopolitanism, helping to form a league of the elite in all regions of the world, while ultimately ignoring the multitudes in hopeless economic isolation and stagnancy. Second, multiculturalism has been paradoxically aloof to the establishment of a transidentity affiliation, and this indifference directly inverts itself into the aggressive rejection of any involvement in the affairs of, for, and by the other. Thus multiculturalism amounts often to another alibi: Under the pretext of eschewing the “colonialist” representation of former colonies, it abandons the natives to their “postcolonial” vacuum and disorder of authority, often a direct result of earlier colonialism itself. There are numerous examples of such developments, the most conspicuous of which are the sub-Saharan countries, where starvation, corruption, pillage, and

violence relentlessly continue—while the Northern nations merely stand by without offering assistance. At home, inner cities are their equivalents. Supported by the idea of postcoloniality, the positioning of colonialism as a past event, multiculturalism works nearly as a license to abandon the welfare of the unprofitable marginals and concentrate on the interests of the dominant. This is what Slavoj Žižek means when he characterizes multiculturalism as “the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism.”

An oppressed and exploited group has the right and responsibility to defend itself, and it requires the firm establishment of a group identity for self-protection. Once survival and self-defense cease to be a desperate necessity, however, identity politics often turns into a policy of self-promotion, or, more exactly, a self-serving sales policy in which a history of victimization becomes a commodity that demands payment. It can pervert itself into opportunism and cannibalism, be it racial, sexual, national, social, or otherwise. In the name of multiculturalism, one privileges one’s own identity, while making merely a token acknowledgment of the other’s—whom one proceeds to disregard when an occasion for help arrives. It is as if self-identity were an article of private property, which the group—but more likely its elite leadership—claims to own and guard exclusively. Exclusionism is destructive, whether among the rulers or the ruled. Entrepreneurial self-assertion sunders any possible political alliance with other marginal groups into uncoordinated and fragmented promotional drives, which most likely head toward a disastrous defeat in the hands of the far better organized dominant parties. In this connection, it may do well to reflect on what Tzvetan Todorov suggests as a common human feature: “The context in which human beings come into the world subjects them to multiple influences, and this context varies in time and space. What every human being has in common with all others is the ability to reject these determinations.”

I do not believe that such freedom is given to everyone, and yet the wish occasionally to alter them, to assume the identity of another, must surely

80. Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” New Left Review 225 (September/October, 1997): 44. The title is abbreviated on the cover of the issue as “Multiculturalism–A New Racism?”
81. Žižek’s New Left Review essay is translated into Japanese by Wada Tadashi in Hihyo kukan, which has several additional pages that have no counterpart in the English version. In this portion, Žižek makes a very similar point about the victimological use of identity politics. See Hihyo kukan 2, no. 18 (1998): 79.
be a very common experience indeed. The borders between beings must remain passable at least in the imagining.

To return to the corporate use of multiculturalism, privatization and entrepreneurship are valorized in globalism. While the corporate system has no reason—or no profit motive—for eradicating racism and sexism, it has similarly little reason—or little profit motive—for always encouraging racism and sexism. In fact, the corporate system stands to gain under certain circumstances by promoting diversity among ethnic and gender groups as it expands its markets, insofar as it can retain class difference and uneven development—the indispensable capitalist condition for cheap labor. Here, identity politics, to which the idea of diversity often irresistibly leads, can easily be played into the hands of corporate management. Every marginal group will be as exclusive and alienated from all others, as it is led by ethnic spokespersons, each working in a self-sealed entrepreneurship, with its identity as a private investment, as capital. Transnational corporatism needs only low-cost labor, regardless of its ethnic origins and geographical roots. Which ethnicities or regions it comes from is of little consequence. In the advocates of exclusionary identity politics, in fact, transnational capitalism, or neocolonialism, finds a soul mate who can stand in as the manager of the group.

In the context of the university’s organization, identity politics is bound to create factionalism and fractionalization. But it now has the imprimatur from the philosophy of difference. The multiplicity of perspectives, specializations, and qualifications is intensified with the rage for differentiation. Agreement is ipso facto suspect and unwanted. Internecine disputation is substituted for political engagement. Thus, in a humanities department now, feminists vie with ethnic groups as well as the male of all kinds; among feminists, essentialists contest anti-essentialists; assaults on the “ludic posties” become the career of “postludic” academics; post-Marxists reject orthodox Marxists; conventional disciplinary scholars hold

83. On 24 September 1989, the House approved a measure aimed at bringing nearly 150,000 skilled foreign workers into the United States. The high-tech industry claims that there is an acute shortage of qualified workers, but it is contested by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers—USA. The applications have no ethnic, national, or regional restrictions. See Jube Shiver Jr., “House Lifts Visa Cap for High-Tech Workers,” Los Angeles Times, 25 September 1998.
in contempt cultural studies writers; novelists despise theorists who can’t
sell products; theorists look down on creative writers as ignorant and self-
absorbed; empirical historians are convinced that theorists are moonstruck
obscurantists; queers believe they are the best because their identities are
identity-less; formalists are proud of their purity, while they are the targets
derision as hopelessly out of date and out of touch according to the politi-
cally engaged; ethnics are opportunists in the eyes of the whites, whereas
the whites are both mindless and heartless troglodytes as the marginals
see them.

Factions disagree with each other on nearly every topic, be it the
B.A. or Ph.D. requirements, recruitment and admissions preferences, pro-
motion, tenure, or even the selection of a guest lecturer. The most difficult
document to compile in any academic unit nowadays may be the general
description of itself, its history and objective, in the form of a handbook or
manual. Strife, however, is not the worst of possibilities: At least people are
talking to each other—even if they do raise their voices. It is common today
to observe a mutually icy-distant silence, which allows everyone to escape
into her/his womblike cocoon, talking minimally to the fewest contacts pos-
sible. Thus, instead of open discussion and argument at a meeting, per-
functory mail ballots—likely by email—decide issues. Education of under-
graduates consists of the mechanical transfer of safe packaged information
unsullied by fundamentals and intricacies; graduate education is somewhat
more involved, but even that is apt to be left to the students themselves.
Uncontaminated as yet, graduate students expect guidance of a general
nature in the humanities but often find that the best part of their education
is in reading groups they form among themselves rather than in the institu-
tional seminar rooms, where the instructors, full of anxieties over other texts
and readings, tend to say nothing of significance. Indeterminacy rules, and
it is a poor bargain for those graduate apprentices who must decide on their
future in the few years allowed them by the production-dictated rules of their
graduate administrators. The administration’s pressure toward quantitative
production—though no one knows the specifications—heats up the internal
mechanics of academia. Nowadays, more frequently than ever, humanities
departments are placed in receivership, an academic equivalence of bank-
rupcy, in which the unit is judged to be incapable of handling itself because
of irreconcilable internal dissension.84

84. See Charlotte Allen, “As Bad as It Gets: Three Dark Tales from the Annals of Aca-
demic Receivership,” Lingua Franca 8, no. 2 (March 1998): 52–59. See also Janny Scott,
The faculty would rather do the things that might promote their professional careers. Untenured assistant professors are understandably in panic; they may not make it. Furthermore, they know that a financial downturn—real or fabricated—can legally eliminate the programs they have worked so hard to get into. But before that eventuality takes place, they must first sneak in, even if there is no guarantee of any kind for their long unfathomable future years. Yet the marginalization of the humanities and the social sciences has been terrifying not only the pretenure faculty but also the supposedly securely tenured professors. The same eventualities face them. They still have many years remaining in their careers, and during these long leftover years, they need to appear confident and attractive at least to their students (customers), if not to their colleagues (business competitors). The sad fact is that many aging professors are finding it difficult to conceal the lack of a project that fully absorbs their interest and energy, if not passion and imagination. But most choose to evade it. It is pathetic to have to witness some of those who posed as faculty rebels only a few years ago now sheepishly talking about the wisdom of ingratiating the administration—as if such demeaning mendacity could veer the indomitable march of academic corporatism by even an inch. To all but those inside, much of humanities research may well look insubstantial, precious, and irrelevant, if not useless, harmless, and humorless. Worse than the fetishism of irony, paradox, and complexity a half century ago, the cant of hybridity, nuance, and diversity now pervades the humanities faculty. Thus they are thoroughly disabled to take up the task of opposition, resistance, and confrontation, and are numbed into retreat and withdrawal as “negative intellectuals”—precisely as did the older triad of new criticism. If Atkinson and many other administrators neglect to think seriously about the humanities in the corporatized universities, the fault may not be entirely theirs.

If all this is a caricature, which it is, it must nevertheless be a familiar one to most in the humanities now. It is indeed a bleak picture. I submit, however, that such demoralization and fragmentation, such loss of direction and purpose, are the cause and effect of the stunning silence, the fearful disengagement, in the face of the radical corporatization that higher education is undergoing at this time.


In the macromanagement picture, there is little likelihood here of a return to nation-statism, which enabled the construction of a national history, a national literature, a national culture, and a national economy during the major portions of the last two centuries. Obviously, the nation-state structure will not disappear anytime soon, but this does not mean that it is still the fecund soil for intellectual and cultural imagination now. That time is over, and it is glad tidings in several ways. At the same time, now unchecked by national and regional sectioning, control quietly made pervasive and ungraspable in the global economy is even more powerfully effective. And there is hardly any space for critical inquiry and cultural resistance in academia that might provide a base from which to launch a challenge to this seamless domination of capital. Does this mean an end to all oppositionist politics?

As long as extreme inequity in power and privilege persists, there will be discontent and resentment that can ignite at a propitious moment. The opportunity will not arrive by the call from an intellectual leader, of course. When the workers and underclass find it intolerable to live on with the uneven distribution of comfort and suffering, they will eventually rise up. The humanities as we have known it for many decades have ceased to be of use for now. Critics, however, can still discern signs among people and organize their findings into an argument and program for dissemination. The academics’ work in this marketized world, then, is to learn and watch problems in as many sites as they can keep track of, not in any specific areas, nations, races, ages, genders, or cultures, but in all areas, nations, races, ages, genders, and cultures. In other words, far from abandoning the master narratives, the critics and scholars in the humanities must restore the public rigor of the metanarratives. Together with those already mentioned, there are several others whose voices I, for one, would cherish to hearken. As importantly, we know that in every institution, there are serious minds who quietly keep toiling in their reflection and teaching, often unrewarded and unacknowledged except by their students. They may well be the ones with whom the people will share their future in large measure. What we need now is this powerfully reintegrated concept of society, where diversity does not mean a rivalry of minorities and factions, and resultant isolation. The emerging orientation of scholarship is likely to appear yet opaque and ill-defined for those accustomed to the clear dictates of the nation-state during the colonial, imperial, and cold-war years. It is no mean task in these days to orient one’s own scholarship in the university that is being reduced to the exclusive
site for R & D. The administrators seem eager to write off the humanities—as an instrument to control minorities, or else merely as a managerial training program in metropolitan manners, style, and fashion, set aside for the socially “elite” institutions. We need a new interventional project with which to combat the corporatization of the university and the mind.

The appellation *ivory tower*, a translation of “tour d’ivoire,” is a cliché and is as taken for granted as the university itself. Examined closely, however, the designation reveals more than we are accustomed to seeing in it: The modern university is indeed built with ivory, a material robbed from Africa and India, where elephants are now nearly extinct, and thus ivory is contraband. The greatest benefactor of the modern university, upon reflection, may indeed be King Leopold of Belgium, Queen Victoria’s uncle, who may have contributed to the extinction of ten million African lives. We should perhaps never talk about the modern university without recalling Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*. The late Bill Readings’s excellent book, *The University in Ruins*, is right in its discussion of the humanities. In other aspects, however, today’s university is immensely prosperous and opulent. No longer far from the madding crowd, the university is built increasingly among shopping malls, and shopping malls amidst the university. It is no longer selling out; it has already been sold and bought. The deed has been written and signed, and the check already signed, too. But the deed has not been registered, and the check not cashed as yet. To right the situation, to null the transaction and be just to all on earth, we may have to relearn the sense of the world, the totality, that includes all peoples in every race, class, and gender.

86. “Ivory tower” is a translation of *tour d’ivoire*, which was first used in 1837 by Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve (according to A *Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. 3), and in 1869 (according to *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary*). The English phrase first appeared (according to the OED Supplement) in 1911, in Henri Bergson’s *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*, trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell (New York: Macmillan Company, 1911), iii, 135. No explanation is given for the choice of *ivory* for indicating seclusion from the world or shelter from harsh realities. The fact that no one—as far as I know—has ever detected in the phrase the connection between academia and ivory, the university and colonialism, might reaffirm the devastatingly accurate denunciation implanted in the phrase.